En este artículo analizo la idea de que se puede hacer filosofía a través de la poesía y trato de darle sentido a la expresión “poesía filosófica”. Sostengo que hay básicamente dos modos de entender esta expresión: 1) como ejemplificación, es decir, la poesía puede servir como ejemplo filosófico de distintas maneras; y 2) como articulación de una teoría filosófica. Aquí analizo la idea de que se puede obtener un tipo de conocimiento sui generis a través de la poesía, así (...) como la de que la poesía puede justificar supuestas verdades filosóficas. Rechazo estas dos ideas y, con ellas, la tesis de que se puede articular una teoría filosófica a través de la poesía. Sin embargo, acepto que no hay nada intrínseco a la poesía que le impida hacerlo, aunque, en general, esto no sucede. (shrink)

In this paper I comment on several aspects of Martin Seel’s paper “The Ability to Deliberate”, mainly on his claims that deliberation is a form of action, on his not very clear distinction between deliberation and thought, and on the relation between normativity and deliberation. There are also some comments on practical and theoretical reasoning, as well as on Seel’s characterization of reasons.

This article enquiries whether normative bioethics can be a science. The article aims to address the conditions of possibility for bioethics to be considered a science, without directly answering the question. The article focuses on two conditions that we typically associate with our common concept of science: truth and knowledge, on the one hand, and naturalization, on the other. Bioethics should be able to provide moral truths and therefore moral knowledge so that we could consider it as a science. On (...) the other hand, the normative character of bioethics raises the question of whether it is possible to naturalize it and make it compatible with a scientific perspective. The article argues that, for normative bioethics to be considered a science, a cognitive and naturalistic stance should be taken on ethics. (shrink)

Several countries have implemented COVID passports or health certificates to promote a safer return to in-person social activities. These certificates have been proposed as a way for people to prove that they have been vaccinated, that they have recovered from the disease, or that they have negative results on a diagnostic test. However, many people have questioned its ethical justification. This article presents some practical and ethical problems to consider if we want to implement these passports. Among the former, it (...) is discussed how accurate diagnostic tests are to ensure that a person is not contagious; whether vaccination guarantees immunity; what are the levels of immunity after infection, vaccination and protection against variants; the fact that passports can be forged; if they encourage vaccination and the problem that there is no universally recognized passport. Among the ethical issues it is discussed whether passports promote discrimination and inequality, and whether they violate the rights to privacy and freedom. It is concluded that passports have enough ethical justification to be implemented. (shrink)

Benjamin J.B. Lipscomb, The Women Are up to Something. How Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch Revolutionized Ethics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2022, 326pp., ISBN 978–0–19–754107–4.